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JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal by defendant Peter Coats ("Peter") from the August 17, 
2009 Summary Judgment Order and the December 10, 2009 Order denying post-
trial relief issued by Judge Denise Lindberg. Jurisdiction to hear this appeal is 
conferred on the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78A-4-103 
and Utah R. App. T. 3(a). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF 
APPELLATE REVIEW 
Issue on Appeal No. 1: Did the lower court err in granting Summary 
Judgment against Peter on the sole basis that he had "defaulted by filing no 
opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, (emphasis added)." Does 
the failure to respond to a opposing party's motion for summary judgment 
automatically allow a court to enter judgment against the non-moving party 
regardless of the merits of the moving party's motion for summary judgment? 
Whether a party is entitled to summary judgment is a question of law reviewed by 
appellate courts for "correctness." Winters v. Schulman, 977 P.2d 1218, 1221 
(Utah App. 1999). "Correctness" means that no particular deference is given to 
the trial court's ruling on questions of law. Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1256 
(Utah 1998). 
Issue on Appeal No. 2: When the facts are undisputed, does the trial court 
have an independent obligation to determine if the underlying claim of the moving 
party is sufficient, as a matter of law, in which to enter judgment against the non-
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moving party? Specifically, was Peter's mere refusal to place all proceeds from 
the sale of the property into a escrow desired by Appellee Caroline Graydon 
(Caroline) a sufficient reason to find him liable for the failed real estate sale and 
assess him over $300,000 in damages? Whether a party is entitled to summary 
judgment is a question of law reviewed by appellate courts for "correctness". 
Coulter and Smith v. Russell 976 P.2d 1218, 1221 (Utah App. 1999). 
"Correctness" means that no particular deference is given to the trial court's ruling 
on questions of law. Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1256 (Utah 1998). 
Issue on Appeal No. 3: Did the trial court err in failing to grant post-
judgment relief pursuant to Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure when 
there was insufficient evidence to find Peter liable for over $300,000 damages 
simply because he refused to place the proceeds of the sale in an escrow account 
demanded by Caroline? The question as to post-trial rulings by a lower court are 
reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard which requires no reasonable basis 
for the decision and so unreasonable that it be classified as arbitrary and capricious 
or a clear abuse of discretion. Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exchange, 860 P.2d 937, 938 
(Utah 1992). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Peter does not believe any constitutional provisions; statutes or rules are 
determinative in this matter. 
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NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the final judgment of the Third District Court, the 
Honorable Denise P. Lindberg presiding, finding in favor of Appellant Michael 
Ward (Michael) and against Peter in a dispute involving the proposed sale of Salt 
Lake County real property owned jointly by Peter and Michael. 
PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Pursuant to Rule 24(i), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Peter adopts by 
reference the Statement of the Case made in Caroline's Brief page 4. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Pursuant to Rule 24(i), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Peter adopts the 
Statement of Facts contained in Caroline's Brief, pages 5-12 with the following 
exception: 
Although there was an order in the divorce action that prohibited 
Coats and Graydon from disposing of or encumbering marital assets, 
Gray don had reason to fear that Coats would violate the court order if he 
received the proceeds of sale. This was because Coats had violated the 
court's order before, by encumbering the marital home and by placing 
encumbrances and easements against the North and South Parcels. These 
facts, in part, were the basis for POA Order entered by Judge Lindquist in 
the divorce action. R. 311-12 fl[7). (Caroline's Brief, p. 10). 
Peter would indicate that while there had been prior historic disputes during the 
long litigation of the divorce action, the divorce court judges had imposed strict 
prohibition against Peter encumbering or liquidating any of the potential marital 
property and therefore any current wTear" that Caroline had of such dissipation was 
completely misplaced and unjustified. 
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Peter adopts by reference the entire "Corrected Statement of Facts" 
contained in Michael's Reply Brief, pages 1-6. 
The undisputed facts occurring in this particular lawsuit have been well 
described by both parties in their briefs and therefore Peter has no need to repeat 
them. However, it is relevant to understand one of the issues in the parallel 
divorce action between Peter and Caroline. In the Third District Court Case No. 
014902286 between Caroline Hayes Graydon and Peter Coats, Judge Atherton in 
November of 2008 found Peter in contempt of court for failing to respond to 
discovery and therefore ordered his Answer struck and a Default entered. The 
Supplemental Judgment and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were 
prepared solely by Caroline's attorney with no input or opposition from Peter. A 
judgment in the amount of $523,508 was entered in Caroline's favor against Peter 
for Peter's alleged interference with the David Hagen sale of the property. This is 
the same sale that forms the basis of Michael's lawsuit against both Peter and 
Caroline in the instant case. 
This award was appealed to this Court in Case No. 20080992. Peter 
contended that even in a default situation the lower court had an obligation to 
examine the evidence before entering a judgment against him and that there was 
no evidence of his liability because of this failed sale. Both Michael and Caroline 
have referred to Caroline's award of $500,000 in their various briefs. A copy of 
the pertinent portion of Peter's Appellant Brief is contained in the Addendum to 
this Brief. 
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Because of an outstanding attorney fee issue, this Court dismissed the 
appeal, without prejudice, and remanded the case for a lower court hearing. Judge 
Atherton has scheduled this matter for September 9, 2010. Once this hearing has 
been held and a final judgment entered, Peter will once again appeal the 
underlying divorce judgment including this award of over $500,000 to Caroline 
based upon the failed Hagen sale. 
In any event, any argument made in this appeal by either Michael or 
Caroline based upon the $500,000 + judgment in the underlying divorce action is 
tenuous at best and should not be relied upon in the instant case until such 
judgment becomes final. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. Peter did not think it necessary to retain legal counsel in the lower court 
when his nephew Michael brought this action against him. Peter did not participate 
in any of the briefing concerning the cross motions for summary judgment. Upon 
learning of the oral argument, Peter attended the hearing and spoke to the Court 
regarding his understanding and concerns. The lower court essentially ruled that 
Peter had "defaulted" by failing to file any responsive pleadings or affidavits to 
the motions for summary judgment and therefore granted Michael's judgment 
against him for over $300,000. This "default" justification was contained in the 
written Order. 
Peter contends that the lower court erred in solely basing its decision upon 
his failure to respond. There is no rule of civil procedure requiring a party to 
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respond to a motion for summary judgment nor is there a "default" penalty defined 
for such failure. Instead, the law is clear that the moving party has the burden to 
show that there is no material dispute of facts and, as a matter of law, the moving 
party should prevail. Thus, the burden was upon Michael to produce sufficient 
evidence and arguments in order for summary judgment to be granted. Whether 
Peter responded or not is immaterial to Michael's burden. It is analogous to a 
criminal defendant remaining silent while the state must prove its case. It was 
therefore error to grant summary judgment merely because Peter did not file any 
responsive documents. 
2. Peter contends that even if the undisputed material facts are viewed most 
favorably to Michael, he is unable to prevail against Peter as a matter of law. To 
do so, the lower court would have to find that Peter violated some type of duty to 
Michael relating to the attempted purchase of the North Parcel by Mr. Hagen. The 
facts show otherwise. The Hagen offer was conditioned upon obtaining a 
quitclaim deed from Caroline in order to remove her cloud of title. Caroline 
refused to do so unless all proceeds from the sale were placed in a special escrow 
account administered by the divorce court. Peter was not obligated by court order 
to do so and therefore refused. Caroline consequently refused to sign a quitclaim 
deed and this failure resulted in the sale's demise. 
Michael has cited no authority requiring Peter, as a matter of law, to 
establish the desired escrow of Caroline in order to persuade her to release her 
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interest. Without such an underlying duty there can be no liability on the part of 
Peter for this failed sale. 
3. Rule 59 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a new trial may be 
granted (or a summary judgment vacated) if the court finds the evidence 
insufficient to justify the verdict or other decision or that it is against law. (Rule 
59(a)(6)). The lower court erred in failing to vacate its prior judgment based upon 
the insufficiency of the evidence that Peter was responsible for the failed sale. 
The mere fact that Peter refused to establish an escrow in accordance with 
Caroline's wishes does not make Peter liable to Michael. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN AWARDING 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST PETER ON THE 
SOLE BASIS THAT HE HAD "DEFAULTED" BY NOT 
FILING ANY RESPONSIVE MEMORANDA OR AFFIDAVITS. 
On July 20, 2009 a hearing was held before the lower court as to the 
various motions for summary judgment filed by the parties. Michael had filed 
dual motions for summary judgment against Peter and Caroline. Caroline filed a 
motion for summary judgment against Michael. Peter, on the other hand, had filed 
no motions nor had he responded to those of the other parties with either 
memoranda or affidavits. 
Peter attended this hearing and requested to speak on his own behalf. The 
following dialogue occurred between Peter and the lower court: 
7 
MR. COATS: Your Honor, if I may go ahead. 
THE COURT: Okay. Well, actually, Mr. Coats, you effectively defaulted on 
this matter. You never responded to this motion. You never 
indicated that you were even going to appear today. I'm not 
really sure what it is that you would be adding by way of oral 
argument because frankly neither side has had the opportunity 
to receive or prepare for any argument that you might make 
today. That is essentially an ambush of both sides. Neither 
of them have the opportunity to consider any argument that 
you might make today because you chose not to file any 
response. 
* * * 
MR. COATS: If I may have a little bit of leeway on this? 
THE COURT: Okay. 
(Tr. Hearing July 20, 2009, pp. 21-2). 
Subsequently, the court made the following ruling at the conclusion of the 
hearing. 
So I am—I think that I'm still where I started out, the Summary 
Judgment should be granted for Ms. Gray don and denied as against Ms. 
Graydon as to Mr. Coats. Mr. Coats"' failure to respond to the motions 
really I think put counsel at a disadvantage here today, but I think that it 
was important to give Mr. Coats at least the opportunity to create a record 
of his position. But as against Mr. Coats because I am reading your motion 
as being a motion as against both defendants that the lack of opposition or 
even Mr. Coats' statement here today I don't believe are sufficient to defeat 
your Motion for Summary Judgment as against Mr. Coats. Okay. So I am 
granting the summary judgment as to Mr. Coats. Id. at 31-32. 
On August 17, 2009 the Court executed its "Order on Summary Judgment 
Motions and Judgment". As pertains to Peter, the Court stated: 
On the ground that defendant Peter Coats defaulted by filing no 
opposition to the Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, said Motion is 
hereby granted as against defendant Peter Coats. Accordingly, Judgment is 
hereby granted in favor of plaintiff Michael Ward and against defendant 
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Peter Coats in the sum of $315,242.72 together with interest thereon at the 
post-judgment rate of 2.4% per annum. . . Costs are awarded to plaintiff 
Michael Ward and against defendant Peter Coats. (R. 322). 
In essence, the lower court granted judgment of over $300,000 against 
Peter because Peter failed to file any response to the summary judgment motion of 
Michael. The lower court termed this as a "default" in terms of the summary 
judgment proceeding. The lower court committed reversible error in this 
characterization and in its analysis. 
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is only appropriate when 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to 
a judgment as a matter of law. Wilcox v. Anchor Water Co. 164 P.3d 355 (Utah 
2007). Summary judgment should be granted only when it is clear from 
undisputed facts that the opposing party cannot prevail. Lach v. Deseret Book, 
746 P.2d 802 (Utah 1987). 
Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides an orderly method in 
which a motion for summary judgment may be made. Subsection c (3)(A) and (B) 
outlines the form in which the moving party's memoranda and affidavit should 
take and discusses the opposing party's memoranda and affidavit. By following 
this procedure a trial court can easily see the agreed and disputed facts and areas 
of law by both parties. 
If the non-moving party chooses not to file counter-affidavits or other 
evidence disputing the facts of the moving party, the facts of the moving party are 
considered to be undisputed. Scott v. Major, 980 P.2d 214 (Utah App. 1999). On 
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the other hand, even if the opposing party fails to file an affidavit, summary 
judgment will still be denied if the affidavit of the moving party shows on its face 
that there is a material issue of fact still present. Frisbee v. K & K Construction 
Co., 676 P.2d 387 (Utah 1984). 
In the instant case because Peter did not file any counter affidavits to the 
summary judgment motion of Michael, it can be assumed that Peter did not 
dispute any of the material facts relied upon by Michael in his motion. The 
substance of these facts is not important here but will be discussed in the next 
section relating to the specific legal theory required by Michael to prevail. The 
only question that remains germane to this section of Peter's Brief is whether the 
complete failure to respond to Michael's motion allows a "default" to be entered 
by the lower court against him. 
It is fundamental that the parties moving for summary judgment must 
establish the right to such judgment based on applicable law as applied to the 
undisputed material issues of fact. Lamb v. B & B Amusement Corp., 869 P.2d 
926 (Utah 1993). The Utah Supreme Court in a recent decision clarified the 
burden and obligations of parties in summaiy judgment proceedings and reversed 
both the trial court and this Court's affirmance of a motion for summary judgment. 
The Utah Supreme Court stated: 
A summary judgment movant must show both that there is no 
material issue of fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). Where the moving party would bear the 
burden of proof at trial, the movant must establish each element of his 
claim in order to show that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In 
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order to meet his initial burden on summary judgment, therefore, Orvis 
must present evidence sufficient to establish that judicial estoppel is 
appropriate under the facts of the case, and that no material issue of fact 
remains. The burden on summary judgment then shifts to the non-moving 
party to identify contested material facts, or legal flaws in the application of 
judicial estoppel. Orvis v. Johnson, 177 P.3d 600, 601 (Utah 
2008)(emphasis added). 
Thus, viewing the instant case in the abstract only, it is clear that a non-
moving party cannot '"default" his opponent's motion for summary judgment since 
to permit such doctrine would negate the requirement that the moving party must 
show both that there is no material issue of fact and that the movant is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. In other words, the actions or inactions of the non-
moving party should not affect the validity of the motion for summary judgment 
and the analysis that must be made by the trial court as to whether it should be 
granted based upon the sole efforts of the moving party. 
This burden is no different than what occurs in a criminal case. The state 
has the burden to prove guilt of an accused. The defendant is not required to take 
the stand and negate the accusation of the state. The prosecutor in a criminal case 
can have his case dismissed as a matter of law without a defendant having to do 
anything if the prosecutor fails to meet his initial burden of proof. Here, the 
requirement is no different. 
A simple example of this summary judgment requirement illustrates this 
principle. Assume that this litigation involves a car accident between Michael and 
Peter. Michael files an affidavit that states that he was driving through an 
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intersection in which Peter was waiting and that Michael proceeded into the 
intersection against the red light crashing into Peter. 
Michael moves for summary judgment on the basis that the facts of the 
accident are undisputed. Peter files no counter affidavits because he also agrees to 
this set of facts. Under the lower court's reasoning, Michael would be awarded 
summary judgment as a matter of law even though his "facts" shows that he is 
legally liable for running the red light in violation of applicable law. In reality, 
however, under the Utah Supreme Court standard the lower court must look at 
these claims and conclude the even though the facts are undisputed they do not 
support Michael's claim of liability against Peter and therefore must be denied 
even though Peter filed no opposing motion or papers. 
Had the Utah State Legislature intended that the mere non-response to a 
summary judgment be fatal to a litigant, it would have so provided in the rules just 
as it has done for litigants who fail to answer complaints. Instead, Rule 56 was 
designed to short cut litigation when additional litigation is not required. It does 
not eliminate the burdens and requirements of the various parties under this 
shortened procedure. 
Thus, the lower court's conclusion that Peter had "defaulted" by his failure 
to respond is incorrect as a matter of law and must be reversed. 
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POINT II 
THE UNDISPUTED CONDUCT OF PETER DURING THE 
HAGAN OFFER DOES NOT GIVE RISE TO ANY 
LIABILITY TO MICHAEL MERELY BECAUSE 
THE SALE FAILED 
As noted supra, merely because facts are shown to be undisputed does not 
automatically entitle a moving party to a judgment against a non-moving party. 
The second hurdle that must be jumped by a summary judgment movant is a 
showing that the undisputed facts equate to liability as a matter of law. If there is 
no liability based upon such facts then there can be no judgment against the non-
moving party. 
In the instant case, both Michael and Caroline filed various supporting 
memoranda and affidavits explaining and detailing the circumstances of the Hagen 
offer and its subsequent failure. Michael and Caroline vigorously disagreed as to 
the legal duty and status of Caroline concerning the property and her failure to 
agree to a quitclaim deed. However, both the parties agreed entirely as to the 
sequence of facts that prevented the $5,200,000 sale from occurring. 
Both Michael and Caroline acknowledge that Peter and Michael accepted 
the offer made by David Hagen after having made a counter offer involving 
several conditions; including the requirement that Caroline quitclaim her interest 
in the property. This requirement was added because Caroline had filed various 
encumbering documents including a lis pendens against the property. Both parties 
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agree that Caroline was not on the title to the property and was not a party to the 
sales contract with Mr. Hagen. 
The undisputed facts also show that Caroline demanded that the proceeds 
of the sale, after proper deductions, be placed in an escrow account established by 
the divorce court until the divorce was final. Caroline maintained that she was 
concerned Peter would dissipate the funds prior to the divorce being final if such 
an escrow was not established. 
All parties and the undisputed material facts show that Peter refused to 
agree to such an escrow based on his belief that he was entitled to manage the 
proceeds himself as long as he did not dissipate or hide any assets as had been 
prohibited by several divorce court orders. 
Consequentially, therefore, Peter would not agree to put the proceeds in an 
escrow; Caroline would not agree to quitclaim her interest in the property without 
the escrow; and without the quitclaim deed of Caroline, the sale to Hagen failed. 
Michael argued that Caroline was under a legal obligation to release her 
liens on the property since she did not have a title interest and was not entitled to 
any of the property proceeds until the divorce court awarded it. The lower court 
disagreed with this assessment and held that Caroline was under no obligation to 
sign a quitclaim deed to the property and was therefore, as a matter of law, not 
liable for the failed sale. 
The correctness of this ruling is now the main event in the instant appeal 
between Michael and Caroline as contained in their respective briefs previously 
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filed with this Court. If this Court finds that Caroline was obligated to clear the 
title that she had encumbered, then her liability for the failed sale becomes 
actionable again. If, on the other hand, she had no legal obligation to give Peter, 
Michael, and Mr. Hagen a quitclaim deed then there can be no liability on her part 
for failing to do so. 
Regardless of the dispute between Michael and Caroline in this appeal, the 
undisputed evidence in the record by both of these parties shows that Peter's only 
claimed transgression was his failure to agree to a court-run escrow in accordance 
with Caroline's wishes. Neither of the parties has cited any authority requiring 
Peter to have done so. Peter was, in fact, completely within his rights to demand 
the full proceeds of the sale of his property be paid to him so that he could manage 
the funds pending any division by the divorce court. He was not obligated to put 
the funds into any escrow desired by Caroline. 
His complete right to reject the escrow prior to foreclosure is even better 
seen in light of Caroline's subsequent effort to capture the proceeds after the 
foreclosure sale. In a hearing to determine the distribution of the proceeds by the 
trustee, Judge Trease ordered that all funds be released in their entirety to Peter 
subject to any subsequent order by the divorce court. Judge Trease stated the 
following 
Regarding the second argument, then, by Ms. Gray don, that she has 
priority over these funds based on her marital interest, I don't agree with 
that as well and deny her claim, then, under that argument as well. I 
think—I'm convinced that Ms. Gray don does not have a statutory interest. 
And although she may have an interest in the future, certainly, or a claim on 
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these funds by virtue of the divorce that is ongoing, I don't think that her 
claim places her in priority over Mr. Coats. And secondly, a plain reading 
of the statute, I think, requires me to establish priorities of the parties. And 
again, as I have indicated, that does not mean that I'm saying that Mr. 
Coats gets this money in the clear, so as to speak, if there is a court order 
out there that these funds not be disbursed or dissipated pursuant to a 
divorce order or a divorce order from the divorce court. 
And so, accordingly, I am finding that Mr. Coats has priority over 
these funds, subject, of course, to the payment of the amount for attorneys' 
fees that Mr. Smith (the trustee) has indicated on the record and will 
indicate in the future regarding his appearance in court today. And I'm 
ordering that the funds be released in its entirety, subject to payment of Mr. 
Smith's attorney's fees, to Mr. Coats. (Civil No. 070906540, December 17, 
2007, pp. 8-9). 
Caroline, according to the undisputed evidence, made no effort to go to the 
divorce court and request that Peter be ordered to establish a court-run escrow 
either before or after the foreclosure had occurred. Caroline already had several 
separate orders from the divorce court judges and commissioners prohibiting Peter 
from liquidating any assets he had or may acquire and may have felt that such an 
effort would be futile. 
If, however, Caroline had specifically obtained a divorce court order 
requiring the proceeds of the Hagan sale be placed in a special escrow, Peter's 
position would be completely different since he would then have been under a 
legal duty to comply with Caroline's wishes. As to what actually transpired, 
however, he was under no duty to either Michael or Caroline to pay his proceeds 
into a court-run escrow and exercised his right to so decline. While this decision 
causally resulted in Caroline's refusal to quitclaim her interest in the property, 
such refusal cannot be traced to Peter's legitimate action. 
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Thus, at the time the motion for summary judgment was filed by Michael 
there was no liability theory upon which Michael could recover from Peter based 
upon Michael's own undisputed facts. Had Peter made a cross-motion for 
summary judgment against Michael, the trial court should have granted such 
motion. However, in the absence of such motion the lower court should have 
denied the motion of Michael and set the matter for trial. 
It is respectfully requested that this Court, as a matter of law, reverse the 
Summary Judgment entered against Peter and enter judgment in his favor based 
upon the uncontested facts and established legal principles. 
POINT III 
THE LOWER COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING TO GRANT 
RULE 59(A)(6) RELIEF FROM ITS PRIOR ENTRY OF 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
After judgment was entered against Peter on August 17, 2009 he retained 
counsel to represent him in further proceedings. On August 31, 2009 Peter's new 
counsel filed a Motion for New Trial and/or to Alter or Amend Judgment and a 
Motion for Rule 60(b) relief. (R. 326-368). 
Peter and Michael briefed the motions and on December 10, 2009 the 
Honorable Denise P. Lindberg denied all the motions of Peter. (R. 411-13; see 
Addendum to this Brief). Although Judge Lindberg specifically addressed Peter's 
claim for relief based upon excusable neglect and surprise which are not raised in 
this appeal, she did not specifically deal with Peter's claim that the Summary 
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Judgment was in violation of Rule 59(a)(6): "insufficiency of the evidence to 
justify the verdict or other decision; or that it is against law." Judge Lindberg in 
her Minute Entry Order stated the following: 
On August 31, 2009, Coats, now represented by counsel, filed the 
present motion. Plaintiff has opposed the motion and explained why 
Coates is not entitled to relief from judgment under either Rule 59 or Rule 
60. The Court agrees entirely with the plaintiffs analysis and incorporates 
herein by reference. The analysis therein more than adequately supports 
the court's determination that Coats' motions fail. 
It is well established that a party may file a Rule 59 motion following entry 
of a summary judgment even though there has technically been no trial. 
Moonlight Electric Assn. v. Oquirrh Systems, Inc., 767 P.2d 125, 127 (Utah App. 
1988). See also, Watkiss & Campbell v. Foa & Son, 808 P.2d 1061, 1066 (Utah 
1991) ("on analysis of Rule 59(a) and the rationale behind this leads us to 
conclude that such a [Rule 59] motion is, nonetheless, procedurally correct.) 
The question as to "insufficiency of the evidence" in a Rule 59 motion 
applies the same test utilized by this appellate Court in deciding the insufficiency 
of evidence on appeal. To support an insufficiency of the evidence claim "the one 
challenging the verdict must marshal the evidence in support of the verdict and 
then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient when viewed in the light most 
favorable to the verdict." McCorvey v. State Dep't. of Transportation, 868 P.2d 
41, 44 (Utah 1993). On a motion for a new trial based on an insufficiency of 
evidence, the trial court should review the evidence and every reasonable 
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inference fairly drawn from it in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict. Peats 
v. Commercial Banks, 746 P.2d 1191 (Utah App. 1987). 
The undisputed evidence in the Rule 59 proceeding is the same undisputed 
evidence that was before the lower court in the original Summary Judgment 
proceeding. The same arguments previously made in the prior section of this Brief 
are applicable here. The only conduct of Peter that Michael and Caroline 
complain about in the transaction with Hagen is Peter's refusal to put the money in 
escrow thereby causing Caroline to refuse to execute a quitclaim deed. 
Peter's action was not unlawful, in breach of contract, or in violation of any 
court order. Peter was perfectly entitled to request management of the proceeds 
until such time as he was required to do otherwise. He was not required to 
appease Caroline in order to satisfy the condition of the real estate contract by 
obtaining her quitclaim deed. Thus, the evidence is clearly insufficient that he did 
anything intentionally or wrongfully to prevent the sale of the property to Mr. 
Hagen. 
While a lower court has wide latitude in its discretion as to whether or not it 
will give Rule 59 relief, the exercise of judicial discretion must be based upon 
some facts justifying its decision. Saltis v. Afflect 105 P.2d 176 (Utah 1940). 
Clearly, a new trial should be granted when prejudicial error has occurred or 
substantial justice has not been done. Pavis v. Grand County Service Area, 905 
P.2d 888 (Utah 1995). Finally, a new trial may be granted under Rule 59 
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whenever there is evidence that would have permitted entry of judgment for the 
losing party. Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14 (Utah App. 1988). 
During the original summary judgment proceeding the lower court did not 
have the benefit of legal input from Peter since he was not represented by counsel. 
However, the Rule 59 proceeding gave the lower court a second chance to 
examine the case after careful legal briefing by both counsel for Peter and 
Michael. The lower court abused its discretion by failing to correct its prior error 
of imposing a judgment of over $3005000 to be entered wrongfully against Peter 
based upon "default" alone and in light of the undisputed facts which show no 
actionable conduct giving rise to any liability claim. 
CONCLUSION 
The lower court erred in finding against Peter on the sole basis that he had 
"defaulted" by failing to file any responsive pleadings in the summary judgment 
proceeding. The lower court did not require Michael to satisfy his burden to show 
both undisputed facts and liability as a matter of law. 
When the agreed upon facts of all parties are examined in detail they reveal 
that Peter did not do any act or fail to perform any act that would make him liable 
to Michael for the failed Hagen sale. Peter was entitled to demand that he be 
allowed management of the proceeds from the sale and, in spite of Caroline's 
opposition, was free to reject a court established escrow. 
Finally, the lower court failed to correct its prior error by affirming the 
summary judgment against Peter in the Rule 59 proceeding even though the court 
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was provided with extensive legal input and authorities from Peter that was not 
available during the original hearing. 
For these reasons, Peter respectfully requests that this Court vacate the prior 
judgment of the lower court and enter judgment of dismissal in his favor. 
Dated this 7th Day of September, 2010 
Craig S. Caok 
Attorney for Peter Coats 
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Blvd., Ogden, Utah 84401 and to Bryce Panzer, Attorney for Defendant-Appellee 
Carolyn Coats Graydon, 257 East 200 South, Suite 800, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84111 this 7th day of September, 2010. 
Craig $./Cook 
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A D D E N D U M 
POINT III 
THE FINDING AND JUDGMENT OF THE LOWER 
COURT RELATING TO DAMAGES FROM THE 
SALE OF THE "NORTH PARCEL" ARE CLEARLY 
ERRONEOUS AND ARE AGAINST THE CLEAR 
WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE. 
Statement of Applicable Facts 
1. Prior to marrying Appellee Caroline. Appellant Peter purchased farmland 
located next to the Jordan River for $5,000 an acre on a long-term contract. This has 
been referred throughout this lawsuit as the "South Parcel", South Jordan, Utah. (R. 336). 
2. Shortly after marrying Appellee Caroline, Appellant Peter purchased 
additional land adjoining the original property in order to avoid being landlocked. This 
has been referred to as the "North Parcel", South Jordan, Utah. (Id. at 2355). 
3. This farmland greatly increased in value throughout the 1990's and through the 
real estate boom of 2000 to 2005. 
4. On February 13, 2007 an offer was made by David Hagen to purchase the 
North Parcel for a purchase price of $5,000,000 with six additional terms. Appellant 
Peter made a counter-offer for the amount of $5,200,000 with ten terms and conditions. 
The counter-offer was accepted. (Petitioner's Ex. 98 from Oct. 7, 2008 Transcript). (See 
Appendix to Brief). 
5. After defaulting Appellant Peter, the lower court made Findings of Fact 
concerning the North Parcel. The Court found that the property was foreclosed upon and 
the trustee's sale netted $3,600,000. The Court further found that "Respondent caused the 
prior sales to fail, including one sale of the North Parcel for $5,200,000." (R. 2335). 
6. The Court then entered the following Finding: 
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21. Because of the foreclosure sale to Respondent's relatives, Petitioner 
and Respondent each received only approximately $931,000, for a difference of 
$523,580 each, which is the cost that should be assessed to Respondent and paid 
to Petitioner as damages for Respondent's dissipation and contempt. The sum 
should be paid to Petitioner from the sale of the South Parcel of the South Jordan 
property as set forth below in paragraph 26. (R. 2336). 
7. The Court then entered a "Supplemental Decree of Divorce" as follows: 
16. Due to the foreclosure sale to Respondent's relatives, Petitioner and 
Respondent each received approximately $931,000, rather than $1,454,508.30, for 
a difference of $523,508, each. That loss and cost shall be assessed to 
Respondent and paid to Petitioner as damages for Respondent's dissipation and 
contempt. The sum shall be paid to Petitioner from the sale of the South Parcel of 
the South Jordan property, as set forth below in paragraph 21. (R. 2349). 
ARGUMENT 
A. Utah Law Requires a Showing of Competent Evidence Even Against A 
Party in Default. 
Utah law requires a litigant who has defaulted the opposing party to nevertheless 
produce sufficient evidence to justify a default judgment. Rule 55(b)(2), U.R.C.P. 
provides the following: 
By the Court. In all cases the party entitled to a judgment by default shall 
apply to the court therefore. If, in order to enable the court to enter judgment or 
to carry it into effect, it is necessary to take an account or to determine the amount 
of damages or to establish the truth of any averment by evidence or to make an 
investigation of any other matter, the court may conduct such hearings and order 
such references as it deems necessary and proper. 
The divorce code similarly provides that: 
A decree of divorce may not be granted upon default or otherwise except 
upon legal evidence taken in the cause. If the decree is to be entered upon default 
of the respondent, evidence to support the decree may be submitted upon the 
affidavit of the petitioner with the approval of the court. U.C.A. §30-3-4 (l)(b). 
This Court has enunciated these principles by noting that while a default judgment 
establishes, as a matter of law, that a defendant is liable to a plaintiff, nevertheless it is 
still incumbent upon the non-defaulting party to establish by competent evidence the 
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amount of recoverable damages and costs that are claimed. Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
Schettler, 768 P.2d 950 (Utah App. 1989). Likewise, the Utah Supreme Court has held 
that to enter a default judgment for unliquidated damages, a judge must review the 
complaint, determine whether the allegations state a valid claim for relief, and award 
damages in an amount that is supported by some valid evidence. Skanchy v. Calcados 
Ortope SA, 952 P.2d 1071 (Utah 1998). See also, Pierce v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92 (Utah 
1986); Russell v. Martell 681 P.2d 1192 (Utah 1984); and Pitts v. Pine Meadow Ranch, 
589 P.2d 767 (Utah 1978). 
Appellate courts give great deference to the trial court's findings of fact in divorce 
cases and will not overturn them unless they are clearly erroneous. Kessimakis v. 
Kessimakis, 977 P.2d 1226 (Utah App. 1999). A finding of fact will be adjudged clearly 
erroneous if it violates the standards set by the appellate court, is against the clear weight 
of the evidence, or the reviewing court is left with "a definite and firm conviction that a 
mistake has been made" although there is evidence to support the finding. Cummings v. 
Cummings, 821 P.2d 472, 476 (Utah App. 1991). 
As will be demonstrated in the next section Appellee Caroline failed to meet her 
burden to produce competent evidence that she was entitled to an award of over $500,000 
for the alleged interference by Appellant Peter in the sale of the North Parcel. 
B. When All of the Evidence Available to the Lower Court is Marshaled in 
Support of the Findings and Judgment of the Alleged Deficiency, There is 
Insufficient Evidence to Support Such an Award. 
In order to challenge a trial court's findings of fact on appeal, the challenger "must 
marshal all the evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate that the evidence is 
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insufficient to support the findings in question." Phillip v. Hatfield, 9904 P.2d 1108, 1109 
n.l (Utah App. 1995). See also, Larsen v. Larsen, 888 P.2d 719, 723 (Utah App. 1994). 
The lower court granted Appellee Caroline's Motion for Entry of Default on 
October 2, 2008 and ordered that the non-related "certified contempt issues" would be 
addressed on Tuesday, October 7, 2008, the time originally set for trial. (R. 2161-62). 
On October 6, 2008 Appellee Caroline moved for the taking of "Petitioner's 
Testimony In Support Of Default Judgment And Entry Of Supplemental Decree." (R. 
2273). The motion requested that the court permit Appellee Caroline to provide evidence 
"at the conclusion of the contempt trial on Tuesday, October 7th in order to assist and 
permit the fair and equitable settlement of the estate". (R. 2273-74). 
Also, on October 6, 2008 Appellee Caroline filed both a "Petitioner's Verified 
Amended Trial Brief and a "Petitioner's Trial Brief." (R. 2170-2221; R. 2222-75). The 
only discernible difference between the two "Briefs" is a notarized signature of Appellee 
Caroline and her affirmation that "she understands the contents thereof, and that the same 
is true of her own personal knowledge, except as to those matters stated upon information 
and belief, and as to those matters, she believes the same to be true." (R. 2220). 
The hearing held on October 7, 2008 was noticed for the purpose of the prior 
certified contempt charges: failure to mediate, improper overnight visitation, and 
delinquent child support. (R. 166-67). The Court stated, "The only matter before the 
Court, as you know, is just contempt today," (Oct. 7, 2008 Tr. pp. 7-8). However, many 
additional areas of testimony were allowed including evidence relating to the final 
judgment and damages. 
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Appellant Peter shall now marshal the evidence relating to the sale of the North 
Parcel most favorably to the findings of the lower court and Appellee Caroline. 
(1) Marshaled evidence taken from Petitioner's Verified Amended Trial Brief. 
"Thereafter, Isabel Coats and David Ward moved to schedule trustees' 
sales of the North and South Parcels. Despite many viable offers to purchase the 
North Parcel for at least $5,000,000, the actions of Respondent thwarted a sale. 
The evidence will establish that the North Parcel could have been sold for a gross 
price of $5,200,000, and that Petitioner was agreeable to such sale, so long as the 
share of the proceeds attributable to Peter Coats (or the marital estate's) interest in 
the property was escrowed pending determination by this Court as to an 
appropriate distribution. Yet Peter Coats refused to close the sale under those 
circumstances, and the North Parcel was sold at a trustee's sale on March 15, 
2007, for a bid of $3,600,000 to Respondents relatives . . . (R. 2190-91)." 
"North Parcel (South Jordan). This property was foreclosed upon, as set 
forth herein, and the proceeds divided, as set forth above. This property was 
acquired subsequent to the parties' marriage. Petitioner claims that Respondent 
dissipated this asset by refusing to close a favorable sale prior to the trustee's sale. 
(R. 2198)". 
"Respondent caused the foreclosure of the North Parcel of the South 
Jordan property to the financial detriment of the marital estate. While that 
property could have been sold for at least $5,000,000, and likely, $5,200,000, the 
foreclosure resulted in the property being purchased by Respondent's relatives for 
$3,600,000, which is a loss, or dissipation, which Respondent caused of at least 
$1,400,000. (R.2201)." 
North Parcel (South Jordan). This was a marital asset, as it was acquired 
subsequent to the marriage. Any monies previously received either by Petitioner 
should be confirmed in her. However, pursuant to Petitioner's Exhibit 16, the 
property was foreclosed upon and the trustee's sale netted $3,600,000. The evidence 
is clear, however, that Respondent caused the prior sales to fail, including one for the 
North Parcel for $5,200,000 {See, Petitioner's exhibit 98, addendum #2, to Real 
Estate Purchase Contract). Had Respondent cooperated in the sale of the North 
Parcel, the parties' proceeds therefrom would have been approximately as follows: 
Total Sales Price: $5,200,000.00 
Commissions & Cost of Sales (7%) <364,000.00> 
1995 Trust Deed, 1999 Note & Brad Smith 
Attorneys Fees (see P16) <1,610,210.97> 
Sub Total $3,225,789.00 
Michael Ward 9.82% < 316,772.48> 
Balance to be Divided $2,909,016.70 
- 2 equals $1,454,508.30 
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(R.2215). 
"Because of the foreclosure sale to Respondent's relatives, Petitioner and 
Respondent each received only approximately $931,000.00, for a difference of 
$523,508.00, each which is the cost that should be assessed to Respondent and 
paid to Petitioner as damages for Respondent's dissipation and contempt. That 
sum should be paid to Petitioner from the sale of the South Parcel of the South 
Jordan property as set forth below. (R. 2216)." 
(2) Marshaled evidence from October 7, 2008 hearing: 
Examination of Caroline Coats by her counsel: 
Q. You indicated that at least the North Parcel of the South Jordan 
Property was sold at trustee's sale on a foreclosure. Prior to that 
foreclosure did you have a good faith offer on the North Parcel of 
that prop—North Parcel of the South Jordan property from a Mr. 
Hagen for $5,200,000? 
A. Yes. My counsel has received a copy of it. 
Q. If you would locate Petitioner's Exhibit 98, which is—it's in four 
of six. (Id. at 52). 
* * * 
Q. As to this real estate purchase contract Petitioner's Exhibit 98 did 
Mr. Hagen and the purported purchaser, as set forth on the first 
page, and Mr. Coats—or excuse me, did Mr. Hagen offer to 
purchase the property for $5,200,000 in a counter offer, Addendum 
No. 2 to that contract? 
A. Yes. Yes. 
Q. Do you know why this sale did not proceed? 
A. Yes, the buyer couldn't close on the property because of Peter's 
refusal to cooperate to get it sold. (Id. at 55). 
Q. Who bought the North Parcel of the South Jordan property at 
foreclosure sale? 
A. At the sale Peter's brother, David Ward, made the bid for 
$3,600,000. However, it appears that all of his family—David's 
children and his wife, all divided the amounts of interest that— 
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interest ownership that they would have in it, so it looks like they 
all purchased it. 
Q. So Mr. Hagen a few months before had offered $5,200,000 and 
Mr. Coats' family members instead at a foreclosure sale got it for 
$3,600,000; is that correct? 
A. Yes. (Id at 59). 
* # * 
Q. Are you currently involved in any civil litigation regarding 
Michael Ward? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Ask you to turn over back to—this is six of six—Exhibit 140. Tell 
me what that is. 
A. It's the docket with the case where Michael Ward is suing Peter 
and me. 
Q. Turn over the Petitioner's Exhibit 141 tell me what that is. 
A. It's the Complaint where Michael is suing Peter and me. 
Q. Michael Ward is Peter Coats' nephew? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What's the nature of the action, the civil action that he sued you 
for? 
A. That he believes he's entitled to the proceeds—if the property is 
sold for the $5,200,000 that he should be able to have 9.82% of the 
$5,200,000 
Q. Versus the $3,600,000? 
A. Versus the $3,600,000. (Id at 62-63). 
* * * 
Examination of Appellant Peter by counsel for Appellee Caroline: 
Q. How come the North Parcel wasn't sold for the $5,200,000? 
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A. Because no one bid it high enough. 
Q. Mr. Hagen did. 
A. No, he did not. He would have purchased it. It was open for 
anyone to purchase. 
Q. Well, we have a fully signed offer from him. Why didn't you 
complete that? 
A. The difference between a signed offer and a closing—I've got 
divorce decrees that are over here and are signed and signed and 
signed. It doesn't mean I'm closed. (Id. at 155). 
(3) Marshaled Evidence from Petitioner's Exhibits introduced into evidence 
during October 7, 2008 hearing: 
Exhibit 98 is a real estate purchase contract for land with an offer by David Hagen 
in the amount of $5,000,000. (See Appendix to this Brief). The original offer contained 
six additional terms as contained in Addendum No. 1. The offer was made on February 
13,2007. 
A counter-offer was made by Peter Coats and Michael Ward raising the purchase 
price to $5,200,000 as well as adding ten other terms or omitting terms of the buyer. The 
counter-offer was accepted by the buyer on March 6, 2007 and an additional addendum 
was made extending the due diligence time for the buyer to inspect the property. This 
was accepted on March 10, 2007. 
Exhibit 141 is a Complaint filed in the Third Judicial District Court by Michael 
Ward against Caroline Coats Graydon and Peter Coats. (See Appendix to this Brief). A 
portion of the Complaint reads as follows: 
23. In the months prior to the trustee's sale, defendant Peter Coats worked 
diligently to procure a purchaser for the property. 
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24. In the weeks and days preceding the foreclosure sale, defendant Peter 
Coats was the procuring cause of various offers of purchase. At least one of the 
offers of purchase was to purchase only the North Parcel for $5,200,000. Plaintiff 
Michael Ward and defendant Peter Coats accepted that offer. 
25. Defendant Caroline Coats Gray don did not accept this offer. 
26. In the weeks and days preceding the trustee's sale, both defendants 
made proposals or demands for conditions for closing. Plaintiff told both 
defendants that he would accept either set. Defendants never agreed on a set of 
closing instructions and did not accept any offer. None of the offers to purchase 
were ever accepted since defendant Caroline Coats Graydon would not accept any 
offer. (P. 6 of Complaint). 
(C) Appellee Caroline Produced Insufficient Evidence In The Record To 
Substantiate A Deficiency Judgment Of Over $500,000 From The Sale Of 
The North Parcel. 
A review of the prior evidence shows that the Appellee Caroline failed to meet the 
standards of evidence required even in a default judgment. The evidence, taken most 
favorably to Caroline shows Peter's active participation in the offer made by Mr. Hagen. 
Peter added an additional $200,000 to the purchase price that would have been divided 
with Caroline. He added additional conditions and terms that were readily accepted by 
Mr. Hagen. The evidence shows that the offer of $5,200,000 was a valid contract subject 
to the various conditions imposed by both the buyer and the seller. 
It is undisputed that the sale did not go through. However, there is no evidence to 
explain why the sale failed. A signed real estate contract is binding on both buyer and 
seller unless there is an "out" provided. Appellant Caroline gives only mere conclusions 
that "Peter did not cooperate" for this failed sale. It is common knowledge that many real 
estate contracts are not closed because of various reasons including financing, title, 
inability to meet conditions, and buyer's right to terminate after inspection. Mr. Hagen 
did not sue Appellant Peter for non-performance that would have likely occurred had 
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Peter arbitrarily failed to convey title. Interestingly, the lawsuit brought by Peter's 
nephew even alleges that the reason for the failed sale was Carolyn's refusal to accept 
terms. 
In summary, it is unknown from the present record what events actually occurred 
to prevent the closing of this sale. In no case, however, can this failure be imputed to 
Peter causing a penalty of over $500,000 in Appellee Caroline's favor. 
As a matter of law, the portion of the judgment giving Appellee Caroline a credit 
of $523,508 should be vacated. 
POINT IV 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING A 
JUDGMENT AGAINST APPELLANT PETER IN 
THE AMOUNT OF $240,220 FOR APPELLEE 
CAROLINE'S ATTORNEYS FEES WHEN THERE 
IS NO EVIDENCE THAT SUCH FEES ARE 
BASED ON NEED AND REASONABLENESS 
Statement of Applicable Facts 
It is undisputed that attorney Brian Harrison originally represented Appellee 
Caroline from April 2001 until August 2003. Attorney Alvin Lundgren was obtained in 
August of 2003 and continued as her counsel until March of 2006. At that time attorney 
Michael Mohrman took over the case on behalf of Appellee Caroline until July 2008 
when Caroline's present counsel, Kelly Williams, entered her representation. Attorney 
Bryce Panzer was also retained by Appellee Caroline to assist in collateral cases 
involving real estate. 
Finding No. 24 of the "Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law" 
states: 
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